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The nobility, graciousness, and 
high-mindedness of the Court can 
occasionally be exerted to forego 
the rightful homage and obeisances 
which are its proper due, and 
condescend to pretermit the 
peccancies of a presumptive, puerile 
brief; but infringement or even self-
curtailment of its organic authority 
is a loss to bench and bar and 
citizen that cannot be brooked. 
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Statement of Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction in this matter is proper under both constitutional and 
statutory provisions. Article VIII, Section 3 [Jurisdiction of Supreme 
Court] states (in relevant part), "The Supreme Court shall have 
original jurisdiction to issue all writs...."1 And Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2-2(1) reaffirms (in relevant part), "The Supreme Court has original 
jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs...."2 The proper filings 
have been made with the Court in petitioning for extraordinary relief 
pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B and Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 19, the attendant fee has been waived per Petitioner's 
Affidavit of Impecuniosity, all notice provisions have been complied with, 
and by order of the Court this matter is now before it. 
1 Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Section 3, as required, is included 
in the Addendum (Appendix "C"). 
2
 U.C.A. 78-2-2(1), as required, is included in the Addendum (Appendix 
"C"). 
Statement of the Issues Raised 
In a mixed question of law and fact, did the Real Party in 
Interest, on appeal de novo of a small claims action from a 
justice court to district court, fail to timely pay a fee to the 
justice court requisite under C.J.A. Rule 4-803(2)(D) and Utah 
Rule of Small Claims Procedure 12(b), and was the district court 
thereby deprived of jurisdiction on appeal? 
1 
I n another mixed question of law and fact, were equitable 
considerations present which would give the district court dis-
cretion to disregard the aforesaid rules and assert jurisdiction? 
I n a question of law, in light of the provision of U.C.A. § 78 -6 -
1 0 ( 2 ) barring higher appeal of a small claims matter "unless the 
[district] cour t rules on the const i tu t ional i ty o f a statute o r 
ord inance" , can the foregoing questions be reviewed by the 
Utah Supreme Court via a petition for extraordinary relief, and 
should any previous holdings of the Court allowing this be 
reversed or modified, and if modified, to what extent? 
And as a state constitutional question raised attendant to the 
last issue, in conditioning extraordinary relief by the Utah 
Supreme Court to be contingent upon a showing of "abuse of 
discretion" if it is to lie against a lower tribunal, does Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 65B(d)(2)(A) conflict with the "original jurisdiction" 
provision of Article VIM, Section 3? 
The Standard of Appellate Review with Supporting Authority 
The Court's careful attention is bidden both to the Statement of 
Jurisdiction above and to Appendix "A" of the Addendum. This 
reproduces a copy of a preface to a case report (Robinson v. City Court for 
City ofOgden, 185 P.2d 256, 257 (Utah 1947)) and the commencement of 
2 
Justice Latimer's opinion therein, which respectively read, 
"Original proceeding by James Robinson against the City Court for 
the City of Ogden, Weber County, State of Utah, and J. Quill Nebeker, 
Judge thereof, to prohibit the judge from enforcing a certain judgment 
holding the petitioner in contempt of court and sentencing him to a fine 
or term in ja i l . " 
and (per Justice Latimer), "Petitioner instituted original proceeding 
in this court to prohibit defendant Judge of City Court of Ogden City, 
Utah, from enforcing a certain judgment holding petitioner in contempt 
of court and sentencing him to a fine or term in ja i l . " (Underlining and 
emphasis added in both instances.) 
It is respectfully submitted to the Court that this matter brought by the 
present Petitioner is identically an original proceeding before it, similarly 
seeking a writ of prohibition against a respondent judge. THEREFORE, 
SINCE APPELLATE REVIEW IS NOT AT ISSUE HERE, there exists no 
reguisite for this litigant to indicate a standard of review for any issue 
raised herein NOR TO DEMONSTRATE THAT SUCH ISSUE WAS 
PRESERVED IN THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW. 
HOWEVER, while conceding no necessity for doing so and solely in 
a spirit of oh-well-what-the-heck, these considerations will be vouchsafed 
in this brief. To wit: 
Presented in the Argument below are citations of the record 
evincing that al l issues were explored at the tr ia l level respecting 
which the Court is now sought to prohibit the district court. 
Therefore, to avoid redundancy they will not be repeated here. 
3 
Further, citing 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error §703(a), "Conclusions of law 
are reviewable, the appellate court not being bound by the conclusions of 
law reached below, and such review is de novo"; and Betenson v. Call Auto 
& Equipment Sales, Inc., 645 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah 1982), "Where issue is 
solely one of law, Supreme Court is as capable of determining the question 
as trial court and is not bound by its conclusions"; I find authority for and 
endorsement of this long-established legal precept I'm advocating, which 
is moreover prettily enunciated in Jarmin v. Shriners' Hosps., 450 N.W.2d 
750, 752 (N.D. 1990), "The trial court's conclusions of law are fully 
reviewable and not subject to the clearly erroneous standard applicable to 
questions of fact". Wherefore, asserting that there is no genuine dispute 
as to any material fact (at least none that are crucial to a determination of 
the issues), and conversely maintaining that all issues are concludable as 
matters of law, I posit a de novo standard of review. 
Additionally, quoting from paragraph 4, The 'Lectric Law Library's 
Lexicon On Certiorari (http://www.lectlaw.com/def/c024.htm), wherein it is 
stated, "By the common law a supreme court has power to review the 
proceedings of all inferior tribunals and to pass upon their jurisdiction and 
decisions on questions of law" (underlining and emphasis added), I would 
rubricate the point that an issue of jurisdiction is before the Court, and by 
its very nature such a determination is intrinsically a question of law and 
stands apart from a review of the proceedings below. 
4 
Determinative Constitutional and Statutory Provisions 
The following state constitutional provision, Utah Code Annotated 
provision, Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule of Small Claims Procedure, and 
Code of Judicial Administration Rule are determinative of the issues of 
this case and their text is reproduced in full in Appendix "C" of the 
Addendum: 
Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Section 3 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(1) 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B 
Utah Rule of Small Claims Procedure 12 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-803 
Statement of the Case 
Effective Legal Writing for Law Students and Lawyers (4th ed. 1992) 
by Gertrude Block denotes, in chap. 6.V Sections of the Brief, "The 
purpose of the Statement of the Case is to show the appellate 
court ...the procedural context in which the issues on appeal 
arose...." And Legal Method and Writing (3rd ed. 1998) by Charles R. 
Calleros, in chap. 19 The Brief—Effective Appellate Advocacy, explains, 
"If the rules require you to state the procedural history in a 
separate section, they typically designate the section as the 
'Statement of the Case.'" 
5 
But Supreme Court Practice (8th ed. 2002) by Robert L. Stern et al. 
advises, in chap. 13.9 Contents of the Statement of the Case, "How 
detailed this summary should be wil l vary with the individual 
case. A brief analysis may be sufficient when the opinion below 
is analyzed or summarized at some length in the Argument." 
Insomuch as the first tripartition of the Argument infra is held by this 
writer to adequately delineate the case procedurally up until the Court 
was petitioned on April 7ib, 2003, to prohibit the district court from 
asserting jurisdiction, the reader is referred thereto in this respect. 
Statement of Relevant Facts 
It is the particular nature of this case that most of the issues it brings 
before the Court derive from questions surrounding the right to petition 
for extraordinary relief and not from matters adjudicated below. The 
mixed question of law and fact as to whether the Defendant/Real Party in 
Interest timely paid the requisite fee to the justice court for appeal de 
novo to the district court is the primary exception to this. And events and 
occurrences appertinent thereto are explicated in detail in the Argument. 
It therefore mostly remains just to expound the circumstances of the 
incident which gave rise to the small claims suit: 
The action arose out of an automobile accident which occurred in 
Tooele City, Tooele County, at approximately 50 N. Main Street circa 2:30 
p.m. on October 16^, 2002. Defendant and Plaintiff were both headed 
6 
northbound in parallel lanes of a four-lane highway. Defendant Castle 
was in the innermost lane, and later testified that she was stopped behind 
a van which was apparently making a U-turn. As Plaintiff Panos drew up 
behind her in the outermost lane, she pulled out around the van and 
transitioned into his lane of travel. Plaintiff contends that she did so 
abruptly and with too short of an interval between their vehicles to avoid 
a collision. Defendant maintains that she assumed the lane safely and 
had traveled a reasonable distance therein when impacted. 
No personal injuries were reported by the occupants of either vehi-
cle. The accident was investigated by a Tooele police officer, but his 
write-up did not attribute blame to either driver. Judgment was found for 
the Plaintiff in justice court, and for the Defendant in district court. 
Summary of Argument 
Counsel for Defendant/Real Party in Interest Castle appealed for trial 
de novo in district court from award of judgment to Plaintiff Panos in 
justice court, but appeal fee due justice court was not paid during the 10-
day filing period allowed. Utah Rule of Small Claims Procedure 12(b) 
and C.J.A. Rule 4-803(2)(D) both require that this fee accompany the 
Notice of Appeal, and the latter rule specifically provides that payment of 
such is [quote] "necessary for conferring jurisdiction upon the district 
court" [close quote]. A multo fortiori it is stare decisis under State v. 
Johnson, 700 P.2d 1125,1128 (Utah 1985) that filing fees are jurisdictional if 
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stated as a requirement per a plain language construing of the applicable 
rules. (Also it is noted soto voce that the Notice of Appeal was defective 
because it was not filed in the court issuing the judgment as required by 
these same rules, but that is not at issue here.) 
Adverse counsel have submitted an affidavit executed by their 
secretary, declaring that she contacted an unnamed clerk of the justice 
court who misrepresented the fees to her as being only the $70.^°- she 
paid to the district court. Although no countervailing affidavits of the 
justice court clerks have been lodged because they will not consent to 
give them (don't want to get involved), they have all stated to this writer 
that they were not so contacted. It is irrelevant in any event, because 
the clerks cannot provide legal advice, and the schedule of filing fees is a 
statutory matter. 
However, the trial judge disregarded all of the above authorities and 
asserted jurisdiction anyway. As to the question of whether he had any 
sort of discretion (equitable or otherwise) to do this, it is argued: 
1.) It is impossible for a judge to exercise discretion over any matter 
apart from having jurisdiction of the case in the first place, and, 
2.) The Supreme Court cannot examine the guestion of whether the 
court below correctly or incorrectly exercised discretion, because extra-
ordinary relief proceedings invoke the original jurisdiction of the Court. 
and it is stare decisis under State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034 at 1037 (Utah 
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1941) that the legal acceptation of an "original proceeding" is "to hear 
[a] cause...uninfluenced or unconcerned or limited by any prior 
determination, or the action of any other court juridically 
determining the same controversy." 
And finally, regarding what was posed to the litigants by the Court in 
the third instance in light of U.C.A. § 78-6-10(2), which reads, "THE de-
cision of the trial de novo may not be appealed unless the court 
rules on the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance"— can 
extraordinary relief nevertheless lie in a small claims matter?: Let it be 
noted that "the decision" therein denotes the final judgment, and only 
the final judgment, of the small claims action. And jurisprudence is 
adduced to show that intermediary review is not to be assumed excluded 
thereby. 
Argument 
I. The honorable Court has posed the issue: 
"Whether the real party in interest, Jennifer 
Ann Castle, failed to timely pay the filing fees 
referenced by Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
Ruie 4-803, and if so, whether that failure deprived 
the district court of jurisdiction to entertain her 
appeal de novo of the small claims judgment." 
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To commence with the latter part of the question first, I can conceive 
of no reason why the referenced rule should not have the effect evident 
from a plain reading of it. (Even if I could think of something, it would be 
contrary to my own interest to so contend, so I'll just let the adverse party 
vie on that point if they choose to or can.) 
As to whether defendant Castle timely paid the filing fees, the 
operative word there is "timely", because this plaintiff will concede that 
finally, after a duration extending past the appeal period, all fees were 
paid; it is a question of when. 
Judgment for the plaintiff was entered in Tooele Justice Court on 
February 7 ^ , 2003 in the amount of $2,465 (this is documented in the 
record at p. 36) , and the aforementioned rule provides in subparts (2)(A) 
thereof: 
"Either party may appeal a small claims judgment by 
filing a notice of appeal in the court issuing the 
j u d g m e n t within ten days of the notice of entry of the 
j u d g m e n t / ' 
On February 2003, five calendar and three juridical days into the 
allotted period, Defendant's counsel filed coram non judice (before the 
wrong court), a written statement purporting to be a Notice of Appeal with 
Third Judicial District Court of Tooele County by mail. A cover letter 
accompanied this (found in the record at pp. 35 & 77). Much more 
could be said about the defectiveness of this filing, but since the Court has 
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limited the issue on briefing to timeliness. I'll confine myself to that aspect. 
This aforesaid cover letter— which was clearly directed to "Third 
District Cour t "— instructed, "Dear Clerk of the Court: Please file the 
enclosed original: 1. (10TICE Of APPEAL Please also find enclosed our 
check in the amount of $70.00 for the appeal." The district court clerk 
accordingly credited the fee in that amount and docketed the case in that 
court on February 13th. 2003, with pretrial conference scheduled for 
March Z&. 
The following day (February 14^, 2003), Plaintiff Panos having 
received a copy of Defendant's Notice of Appeal in the previous day's 
mail, Plaintiff immediately hand-delivered to Defendant's counsel a letter 
which cautioned, "The purpose of this letter is ... to serve 
appropriate notice on you that you should:... In particular I would 
ask you to consider whether your appeal should be filed with 
Third District Court in Tooele County/' At that point the time for 
appeal still had (due to President's Day intervening) 10 calendar and 5 
juridical days left to run. Receipt of this letter was acknowledged by 
inscription of the signature of the firm's managing partner on a copy 
thereof (a reproduction of which is in the record at p. 48). 
Nevertheless, despite this clear warning. Defendant's counsel took no 
heed to do anything about it until he received Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss 
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Appeal on February 25^, 2003. The very next day thereafter, Defend-
ant's counsel dispatched a $10^°- check and attendant letter (a repro-
duction of which is in the record at p. 68) to the Tooele Justice Court, 
which read in relevant part, "Pursuant to our phone conuersation of this 
morning, we have recognized that this office has inaduertently failed to send 
the Justice Court the $10.00 filing fee required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-6-
14(4). fls you are aware, this office has already supplied the $70.00 filing 
fee required for de nouo with the District Court...." 
The justice court accepted this proffered payment, but it clearly was 
effectuated beyond the allotted time for appeal, and this is disallowed by 
the following statute and rule: 
"At the time of filing the notice of appeal, the appellant 
must deposit into court issuing the judgment the fees estab-
lished under Utah Code Ann. Section 21-1-5 [renumbered as 
78-7-35] and Section 78-6-14." (Utah Code of Judic ia l Admin-
istration Rule 4-803 (D)) 
"The appropriate fee must accompany the Notice of 
Appeal." (Rule 12 o f t h e Utah R u l e s o f Small Claims Procedure) 
Photocopies of these rules (found in the record at pp. 54 & 
55) were provided the trial court as exhibits to Plaintiffs 
Motion to Dismiss, and their application argued in that 
pleading (citing to record at p. 62.) Nevertheless, despite the clear 
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import of these provisions, Judge Skanchy ruled at pretrial conference on 
March 17&, 2003, that payment of the filing fee was not jurisdictional for 
de novo appeal to the district court to lie. (Refer to Minutes of Pre-
trial Conference/Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Appeal 
at p. 133 of record; copy exhibited in Addendum, Appendix MD"). 
Thereafter a pleading entitled Motion for Reconsideration was 
submitted to the trial court. The pleading was accepted and the motion 
granted. However, the court having reconsidered as prayed, its ruling 
remained unchanged. (Citing to Minutes of Trial De Novo at p. 154 
of record; see Appendix "D".) But at p. 5 of this pleading (p. 144 of 
the record) additional case law and argument were presented. To wit: 
"The Utah appellate courts have consistently used the 
same standard to determine 'whether the payment of 
[statutory] filing fees, like the timely filing of a notice of 
appeal, is jurisdictional and therefore necessary to perfect a 
timely appeal.' State v. Johnson, 700 P.2d 1125, 1128 (start 
of subdivision ll)(Utah 1985). 
That standard is the plain language construing of the 
applicable rule. 
For example, in Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply 
Co., 676 P.2d 952 (Utah 1984), the Supreme Court 
'concluded that failure to pay the filing fee within the 
requisite period is a defect of jurisdictional magnitude.' 
Johnson [700 P.2d 1125] at 1128." (Underlining added.) 
13 
The court below having been thus presented the law, it is 
asserted that its ruling-—maintaining that, in the case then before 
it, payment of the filing fee was not precondition^ to its having 
jurisdiction— is plainly in error: and it had no power to entertain 
the Defendant's small claims appeal de novo. But I warrant and 
aver that the nature of this present Supreme Court proceeding 
excludes that from being a factor in your determination of this 
cause. I cite from the dissenting opinion of So-so Reverend Justice 
Pratt in State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034 at 1044-1045 (Utah 1941): 
"Mr. Justice LARSON rather emphatically draws the line 
between appellate jurisdiction and original jurisdiction. He 
states: 'That jurisdiction which is not appellate is original.' 
Thus they are mutually exclusive. He continues: 'Appellate 
jurisdiction is the jurisdiction to review the decision or 
judgment of an inferior tribunal, upon the record made in 
that tribunal, and to affirm, reverse or modify such decision, 
judgment, or decree/ He continues later in his decision: 
'Original jurisdiction as contradistinguished is the right to 
hear the cause, to make its own determination of the issues 
from the evidence as submitted directly by the witnesses; or 
of the law as presented, uninfluenced or unconcerned or 
limited by any prior determination, or the action of any other 
court juridically determining the same controversy. Original 
jurisdiction as here used means the right of the court to 
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make its own record, its own finding and determinat ion/" 
(Underlining added.) 
At this juncture I believe an admonitory caution should be stated 
to the Court that, in relation to the above points, Defendant's counsel 
has sought to obfuscate them in two ways: 
First of all, with regard to the case of Gorostieta v. Parkinson. 2000 UT 
99,17 P.3d 1110, Defendant's counsel has assayed to show the honorable 
Court a horse and sell it a donkey. At p. 3 of adverse party's Answer to 
Petition for Rehearing (filed with Utah Supreme Court on 7 / 3 0 / 0 3 ) , 
this blarney was proffered: 
"Gorostieta is also analogous to the present matter for 
reasons not addressed by Mr. Panos in his petition. In that 
case, the clerk of the Court allowed the fees to be paid at a 
later date." 
Perhaps the easiest way to dispel this is just to recite from one of the 
head notes of the case report: 
"o. APPEAL AND ERROR. APPEAL BY GUARDIANS IN NEGLIGENCE 
ACTION WAS TIMELY, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE FILING FEES 
WERE TIMELY PAID UPON THEIR BEING MAILED WITH THE PERMIS-
SION OF THE DISTRICT COURT CLERK ON THE LAST DAY FOR FILING 
THE APPEAL. WHERE THE CLERK ACCEPTED THE FAXED COPY OF THE 
NOTICE OF APPEAL AS BEING TIMELY FILED." (Underlining added.) 
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And to quote from the Court's holding itself at p. 1115, U 18: 
"THE CLERK TOLD THE SECRETARY THAT SHE WOULD ACCEPT THE 
NOTICE OF APPEAL BY FAX SO THAT THE SECRETARY D I D NOT HAVE TO 
TRAVEL FROM SALT LAKE CLTY TO LOGAN, AS LONG AS THE ORIGINAL 
NOTICE A N D FILING FEES WERE MAILED FORTHWITH/ ' 
(Underlining added.) 
If Defendant's counsel is able to discern correspondence between 
that set of facts and his own tendering of the requisite fee and its receipt 
by the Tooele Justice Court three days after the period for appeal had run 
and more than two weeks after filing his notice of appeal, I am impressed 
with his elasticity of mind. 
The second bait-and-switch Defendant's counsel has endeavored to 
foist upon the Court hinges on the fact that like the Supreme Court and 
Third District Court, Salt Lake Dept., at 450 S. State Street Tooele 
Justice Court and Third District Court, Tooele Dept, both share the same 
address 47 S. Main Street, Tooele. So Defendant's counsel has sought 
to promote the fallacy that the Notice of Appeal was merely miscaptioned 
as for the District Court, but it was nevertheless sent TO the Justice Court 
and not the District Court. (Or at least that's the notion he'd like you to 
confusedly believe, trading upon the point that the mail of both of them is 
delivered to the same location.) Please note the convenient ambiguity 
to be found at the aforementioned segment of the Answer to Petition for 
Rehearing where it reads, 
"In the present matter, as fully set forth in Ms. Castle's 
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Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Extraordinary 
Writ, the clerk of the Tooele Court [which one?] was contacted 
regarding the payment of fees." 
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II. The honorable Court has posed the issue: 
"Whether the district court had equitable 
discretion to disregard the requirements of Rule 4-
803. If so, what is the authority supporting such 
equitable discretion." 
I suppose, if this consideration had pertinence to the instant matter at 
bar, that I could point out that the Utah Supreme Court recently 
emphasized the importance of compliance with the Rules of Judicial 
Administration in Lovendahl v. Jordan School District, 2002 UT 130, 63 P.3d 
705. However, it don't make no never mind no how, so why bother? It 
matters not whether the court below correctly exercised 
discretion, or didn't correctly exercise discretion. It is 
irrelevant to the nature of this proceeding. 
As will be further developed in the subsequent argument hereafter, 
this petition for extraordinary relief is brought pursuant to the honorable 
Court's original jurisdiction and not its appellate jurisdiction. I'm not the 
17 
least bit assured that the honorable Court has any grasp of the difference 
between the two, so let me cite by way of explanation: 
"'Original jurisdiction' as contradistinguished from 'appellate 
jurisdiction' is the right to hear a cause and to make an original 
determination of the issues from the evidence as submitted directly by 
the witnesses, or of the law as presented, uninfluenced or limited by 
any prior determination of any other court juridically determining the 
same controversy." (Underlining added.) 
Words and Phrases, 30 Original Jurisdiction 520 citing 
State v.Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034, 1036, 1037, 100 Utah 316. 
"'Original jurisdiction' as used in the constitutional provision... 
means the right of the...court to make its own record, its own finding, 
and its own original, independent determination not founded on one 
previously made and not based upon or limited to the review of 
another court's judgment or proceedings." (Underlining added.) 
Words and Phrases, 30 Original Jurisdiction 520 citing 
State v.Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034, 1036, 1037, 100 Utah 316. 
"The 'jurisdiction' to consider causes...and to decide them on the 
law and evidence according to the right of the case, independent of 
the rulings and judgment of the lower court, is original and not 
appellate." (Underlining added.) 
In re Burnette, 85 P. 575, 577, 73 Kansas 609. 
"'Jurisdiction' is the power to hear and determine, and ...the 
power of an appellate court in dealing with the pleadings and the 
evidence, in the application of the law and in the rendition of the 
judgment according to the right of the case, all independent of the 
action of the lower court. ...is not 'appellate jurisdiction' within the 
meaning of laws creating jurisdiction." (Underlining added.) 
Words and Phrases, 30 Original Jurisdiction 521 citing 
State v.Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034, 1038, 100 Utah 316. 
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"Original jurisdiction as here used means the right of the court to 
make its own record, its own finding and determination. An original 
determination is not one founded upon one previously made. It is 
original in the sense that it stands alone upon its own base, not the 
outgrowth of some other." (Underlining added.) 
State v.Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034,1037,100 Utah 316. 
"Original jurisdiction as used in the constitutional provision means 
an independent jurisdiction, one not based upon or limited to review 
of another court's judgment or proceedings." 
Wheeler v. Northern Colo. Irrig. Co., 9 Colo. 248, 250,11 P. 103. 
"The right of the ...Court to hear and determine for itself, upon its 
own record, any cause which is lawfully before the court cannot be 
denied because the Constitution grants it the jurisdiction to make an 
original determination." 
State v.Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034,1039, 100 Utah 316. 
"Each hearing which starts from 'scratch' and permits the parties 
to produce all available proper evidence on all of the issues is an 
original hearing before the court. — o n e unfettered, unlimited, or 
unconfined bv the hearing had before any other court or tribunal." 
(Underlining added.) 
State v.Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034, 1038, 100 Utah 316. 
The honorable Court's attention is called especially to the stipulation 
of the last citation above, and further to the fact that the present cause 
before it is an original proceeding. And hence these additional citations 
are moreover presented for the Court's elucidation: 
"A proceeding in superior court to review a decision of state tax 
commission denying taxpayer a refund of income taxes, as authorized 
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by statute, is an 'original proceeding' rather than an 'appeal'...." 
State ex rel O'Neill v. Hall, 110 P.2d 960, 963, 57 Ariz. 63 
"Action challenging findings of fact, conclusions of law or order of 
Public Utility Commission was not 'original proceeding' or 'original ac-
tion,' but was an appeal...." 
US West Communications, Inc. v. Eacbus, 862 P.2d 102, 
124 Or.App. 325.—Pub Ut 189. 
Now look, I don't object if, either out of idle curiosity or for whatever 
dubious insight you think it may provide you in making your own 
independent determination, you wish to understand what was in the 
Reverend Mr. Skanchy's mind (if indeed anything at all) when he 
disregarded C J.A. Rule 4-803. Fine, bemuse yourselves with that if you 
wish. But if that indicates a disposition to subvert this original 
proceeding by transmuting it into an appeal where you accord him 
deference under some sort of review for abuse of discretion, then the 
Court is off the reservation. 
*A« aAi *A> «A« *&« *Aa «X« *Aa *ft« «.U *X* *X* *A« •£« ».*.• mX» *.*.. «J- »*«• a\* »£* aft* *K* *.la •.»-. »*.. *£« «.f- » f - *£• «.*.» •.*-. *&« aK* *A« *».» < b »JU »J* »><U *&» »*.» »J» *^ U »A. JU J U *&» *£• «JU J U «A. 
However, lest I seem petulant to the Court, or combative with it, let 
me provide argument on the point you have raised: 
IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR A JUDGE TO EXERCISE DISCRETION 
(equitable or otherwise) IN ANY MATTER IN A CASE IF HE HASN'T FIRST 
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OF ALL GOT JURISDICTION OVER IT. (It's sort of like saying "Always 
respect niggers" the proposition is inherently flawed.) Before a judge 
is vested with authority to waive the application of any of the Rules of 
Judicial Administration in regard to any aspect of a case, it must be 
preceded by him having acquired jurisdiction of the case. And if that is 
controlled by those very same rules, so be it. I am well aware that in 
Scott v. Majors, 1999 UT App 139,112, 980 P.2d 214, this court stated that 
the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration "are not intended to, nor do 
they create or modify substantive rights of litigants, nor do they decrease 
the inherent power of the court to control matters pending before it." 
(Under-lining added.) But the operative phrase in that statement is 
"pending before it". No matter in a case is pending before a judge apart 
from 
jurisdiction, and Rule 4-803 determines when a court has jurisdiction. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE RAISED 
I am prepared to deal more fully (contingent upon what emerges in 
the adverse party's brief) with the non sequitur presented by a judge 
"exercising discretion" to acquire jurisdiction of a case, but for the 
moment I must move on to another non sequitur, that of the conflict of 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 65B(d)(2) with Article VIII. Section 3 of 
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the Constitution of Utah: 
Rule 65B(d)(2) directs that "appropriate [extraordinary] relief may be 
granted: (A) where an inferior court, administrative agency, or officer 
exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its 
discretion" (underlining added). But Const, art. 8, § 3 specifies "The 
Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs" (underlining added). SO WHERE'S THE CONFLICT? Well, let's 
see if two more citations will enable you kids to see it for yourself: 
"It will at once be noted that original jurisdiction is used here in 
contradistinction to appellate jurisdiction. That jurisdiction which 
is not appellate is original. Appellate jurisdiction is the jurisdiction 
to review the decision or judgment of an inferior tribunal, upon the 
record made in that tribunal, and to affirm, reverse or modify such 
decision; judgment, or decree." 
State v.Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034, 1037, 100 Utah 316. 
"'Appellate' pertains to the judicial review of adjudications. 
'Appellate jurisdiction' is the power to take cognizance of and review 
proceedings had in an inferior court...." 
Ex parte Henderson, 6 Fla. 279. 
DON'T YOU GET IT? RULE 65B(d)(2) AND CONST. ART. 8, § 3 CANNOT 
COINCIDE! If in determining whether to grant extraordinary relief the 
Court looks to see if an inferior court abused its discretion, it is exercising 
appellate jurisdiction and is not proceeding under art. 8, § 3. 
Despairing that the penny might not have dropped down the slot with 
the honorable Court even now, I close with a brief restatement of the 
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argument yet again, starting with the gloss of "original jurisdiction" in 
Black's Law Dictionary for illustrative contrast and counterpoint: 
"originaljurisdiction. A court's power to hear and decide a 
matter before any other court can review the matter. 
Cf. appellate jurisdiction." 
Yeah, yeah, ask any juridical incompetent (which is virtually anybody 
with a state Bar no. after their name) what "original jurisdiction" means, 
and that's probably how they'll denote it. BUT THAT IS BY NO MEANS 
THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE TERM TO BE HAD PER THE MAXIM OF 
STARE DECISIS UNDER UTAH LAW. I conclude by invoking the Very 
Most Reverend Justice Wolfe: 
historical aside: When reading Utah Supreme Court holdings as a 
diversion, I like to return back half a century or so. Seems like 
then, if the bench divided over issues, they didn't just differ, they 
nearly derided one another in their opinions. And none was more 
two-fisted than Justice Wolfe. Always one to have his own say, 
whether concurring or dissenting, you could pretty much count on 
Justice Wolfe to voice himself separately. For him to have 
endorsed this notion as emphatically as he did, he must have found 
something which really recommended it. 
"I concur. The opinion very clearly develops the thesis 
that "original jurisdiction" as used in the Constitution does 
not mean that an action must be brought in the court having 
original jurisdiction, nor that there is a right originally to 
initiate it in that court. The word "original" expresses an 
adjudicative power of the court to function originally in 
regard to that litigation, independently of another tribunal, 
as it could have done if originally brought in that court and 
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not as a court reviewing the action of another tribunal. I 
think the distinction sound and the only one workable under 
the various provisions of our constitution." (Underlining 
added.) 
State v.Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034, 1044, 100 Utah 316. 
But cross-check again that sage reckoning with the stipulation of 
Rule 65B(d)(2) that "appropriate [extraordinary] relief may be granted: (A) 
where an inferior court, administrative agency, or officer exercising 
judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion" 
(underlining added). Justice Wolfe is surely turning over in his grave. 
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equity, n. 3. The recourse to the principles of justice to 
correct or supplement the law as applied to particular 
circumstances, [as in], "The judge decided the case by equity 
because the statute did not fully address the issue." 
[Or as in], "In appealing to the equity of the court, she was 
appealing to the 'king's conscience'." 
Black's Law Dictionary 
As a third response to the Court's briefing issue as rehearsed at the 
beginning of this section of argument, it must be noted that the question 
of whether the district court had discretion to disregard C.J.A. Rule 4-803 
carried the qualification "equitable" discretion. Arguendo, let's say it 
did have such discretion as a matter of equity. Then what 
facts of the case would require that such equity be 
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exercised? I know of none. 
The only possible thing I can think of in this regard is the assertion by 
Janet Layosa, the secretary of the counsel to the adverse party, that in 
filing de novo appeal from justice court to the district court, one of the 
justice court clerks allegedly informed her that the fee due was only 
$70.°-°-. Well, to begin with. I have queried all of the justice court clerks. 
and none of them has any recollection of ever so advising her. 
I therefore did previously make a motion to the Court to have 
Ms. Layosa's affidavit asserting this (found at pp. 7 9 , 8 0 , 322 & 323 of 
record) struck as sham, and adverse counsel objected to this because 
my motion wasn't supported by countervailing affidavit. I would have 
presented my own affidavit to this effect, but I didn't want the contention 
to be one of "I say that the justice court clerks said to me...". I wanted 
them to speak for themselves. But when I tried to get affidavits from the 
clerks, none of them wanted to get involved. I asked Judge Pitt of the 
justice court to prevail on them to do this, and he said the Supreme Court 
had investigators (he really said that) to determine such facts as needed. 
But arguendo again, let's suppose the adverse counsel's secretary 
really did call the justice court, and someone there really did tell her the 
only fee due was $70.^°- to the district court. What the hell 
difference does it make? Court personnel cannot 
dispense legal advice. 
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At p. 5 of adverse counsel's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's 
Motion to Dismiss Appeal (p. 84 of record), it is proclaimed, " I t should 
be noted that the [Utah] Supreme Court noted in Dipoma that a party 
should be able to rely on the statement of Court clerks. See id. [Dipoma v. 
McPhie, 29 P.3d 1225 (2001)] at 1229." And this was rehearsed before this 
Court at p. 7 of adverse counsel's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Petitioner's Petition for Extraordinary Writ (p. 331 of record), where it 
was again ballyhooed, "This Court noted in Dipoma that a party should be 
able to rely on the statement of Court clerks. See id. at 1229. In the 
present matter, Counsel's secretary called the clerk to verifythe [sic] amount 
due and reasonably relied and in fact acted on that advice." And much, 
much, much has been made of that by adverse counsel, who has 
greatly trafficked upon it. Well, if you go to the actual reference, it 
speaks of "reasonable reliance by parties on a [court clerk's] 
acceptance of a pleading." It is very important that we understand 
what is in view in that holding of the Court, and that we be able 
to distinguish between statements made by clerks 
in reference to the duties of their office, and ones 
made apart therefrom. 
Let's say I am in Nephi and have until Friday to file a Petition for 
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Rehearing with the Utah Supreme Court. And at 9 a.m. on the morning 
it's due, I call Pat Bartholomew and say, "Pat, I mailed that to you the 
day before yesterday. Please check and make sure you got it. 
Otherwise I'll have to drive up there with another copy and file it in 
person." Then she comes back on the line and assures me, "Don't 
worry; it's here. It's been stamped and filed." Well, it's a duty of her 
office to know what's on file with the Court, and what's not on file. I 
can't go to a volume of the Utah Code Annotated and determine that for 
myself. It's not recorded in a statute somewhere. The only people 
who'd be able to tell that are court personnel. And I must rely on what 
they inform me. 
So if it turns out later that I was misled by Pat Bartholomew about 
that, Chief Justice Durham can't simply say to me, "I guess it's just hard 
cheese for you, Mr. Panos. The time for filing a Petition for Rehearing is 
past, and I can't do anything about it." No, if Pat Bartholomew admits 
she wrongly advised me in that regard, it's the Court's fault, and, for the 
sake of equity, I should be allowed to file late. 
However , let's suppose the Court were to have denied my original 
imploration for extraordinary relief. And I rang up Pat and inquired, 
"Gee, can't I get any further review or reconsideration in this matter?" 
And she rejoined, "Uh uh, that's it. There's no provision for any 
supplemental action." If, three months down the line, some lawyer tells 
me I could have asked for rehearing under Appellate Procedure Rule 35, 
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I can't go down to the Matheson Courthouse and rage and fulminate to 
Chief Justice Durham, "Your sh**-for-brains clerk doesn't know her job! 
She completely misguided me as to the allowance made by Rule 35." 
Chief Justice Durham wouldn't be fit for her post if she didn't retort, 
"You can inquire points of law of my clerk as you will and she can advise 
on them as she wishes, but the risk of misdirection is solely yours. It is 
not a function of her office to provide such instruction. The court staff do 
not exist for the purpose of leading the public through the legal process. 
Questions of rehearing rights [and filing fees due] are matters of statute, 
and, pro se or not, you are expected to know them yourself, without 
regard or resort to anything my clerk may tell you. BUT if she warranted 
to you that something was filed when it was not, that's a horse of another 
color, because you are entitled to rely on her in such respects." 
And by the way, Janet Layosa doesn't work in a nail salon; her bosses 
are three attorneys. So if she had some question about the statutory 
schedule of filing fees, why didn't she just ask one of them instead of 
calling (if indeed she ever did) some little peon in the Tooele Justice 
Court? Or does that reflection provide some sort of profound insight and 
commentary on the professional capabilities of Paul H. Matthews & 
Associates, P.C.? (Like they wouldn't know how to look it up.) 
III. The honorable Court has posed the issue: 
"Whether, notwithstanding the requirements of 
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section 78-6-10(2), which bars further appeal 
'unless the court rules on the constitutionality of a 
statute or ordinance,' an extraordinary writ may 
nonetheless provide a further avenue of relief. If 
so, whether, and what, limits should be placed on 
the scope of the relief. If not, should this court 
reconsider or modify its holding in Kawamoto v. 
Fratto. 994 p.2d 187 (Utah 2000), which permitted 
such relief." 
In commencing my apology on this point, I would like to reinvite 
attention to the case of State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1941), in 
which the Court was asked to resolve the question of whether the 
constitutional provision of art. 8, § 7, vesting "original jurisdiction" in the 
district courts over specified classes of cases, should be construed as 
requiring that such cases be instituted in initio in the district courts rather 
than justice courts. The Utah Supreme Court most emphatically held that 
NO, such was NOT the proper interpretation, and esteeming its holding in 
that case to be very cogent and perspicacious, I hereafter cite it frequent-
ly. To wit (AND THIS IS PERHAPS THE MOST 
CRUCIAL CITATION IN THIS BRIEF): 
"[W]hat is the meaning of the term original jurisdiction? 
DOES IT REFER TO THE LOCUS OR SITUS OF THE 
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INITIAL INSTIGATION OF A LEGAL CONTROVERSY, fir 
does= it refer to the nature of the adjudicative power of 
the tribunal? DOES IT REFER TO THE TRIBUNAL 
WHERE THE PROCESSES INVOKING JUDICIAL ACTION 
MUST EMANATE OR BE FILED IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, 
or does it define the form and extent of the juridical 
power? We have no hesitancy in saying it is the latter." 
(Italics, emphatic capitalization, and underlining added.) 
State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034, 1036, 100 Utah 316. 
Now you present bunch who sit in the seat of Moses, arrayed up there 
on the top floor of the Matheson Courthouse like five blackbirds perched 
on a telephone wire, consider a concern long and hard that those who 
wore those court robes before you once carefully regarded, ones perhaps 
more worthy than yourselves, and ponder well what Justice Larson went 
on to pen writing for the majority: 
"Article VIII [of the Constitution of Utah] vests the whole 
judicial power of the government in the courts therein 
enumerated. The Supreme Court is given original 
jurisdiction as to certain specified writs, and in other cases 
appellate jurisdiction only." (Underlining added.) Idem 
Now just to be sure you've got that apprehension fixed in your minds 
with absolute certainty, let me hammer on it further: 
Constitutionally you have been afforded just two types of authority 
which you may exercise: 
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1.) Original jurisdiction over all extraordinary writs and questions of 
state law certified by a court of the United States, and, 
2.) Appellate jurisdiction over all other matters to be exercised as 
provided by statute. (That's it, kids, that's all she wrote.) 
Now just to be sure you understand that last part about "to be 
exercised as provided by statute", let me retranslate that for you: it 
means the Utah State Legislature can by statute abridge your appellate 
jurisdiction to whatever extent it deems fit. THINK NOT? (I'm reminded 
of that classic line in the Katherine Anne Porter novel Ship of Fools 
where the Jew is asked why he doesn't take the Nazis seriously, and he 
guffaws and responds, "My friend there are over 3 million Jews in 
Germany alone. What are they going to do, kill us all?) 
Well, let's take small claims actions as an example. The state 
legislators have decreed by statutory fiat (remember, it was you who 
quoted the title, chapter, and section to me in your outline of briefing 
issues) that you shall have no appellate jurisdiction over such cases; so 
by the white Christ, you have no appellate jurisdiction over small claims 
actions. And you guys are so pleased with that you want to divest your-
selves even further and not even be able to exercise original jurisdiction 
by extraordinary writ over them either. Oh yeah, that's a real smart 
idea. (If Justice Panos were on the bench, I'd approach that proposition 
will all the tentativeness of an agnostic's prayer: "O God if there is one, 
save my soul if I have one.") 
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But like it or lump it, I didn't invoke the honorable Court's appellate 
jurisdiction. I invoked your original jurisdiction. And you have the discre-
tion to grant or deny me the relief I petitioned you for, but constitutionally 
you cannot circumscribe me from invoking that jurisdiction, and if yet the 
Court does, it incurs harm to itself. 
Is there some silly statute which says small claims actions aren't 
appealable? So what! Who cares! What relevance does that have to 
the instant case? The question presented by the matter at bar before 
you sure as **** don't involve no ******* appellate review. |n proof of this, 
having already cited sustaining authorities nearly ad infinitum in previous 
argument, I now invoke yet four more as follows: 
Marbury v. Madison? You gotta be kiddin' me! (Yeah, I 
bet you thought you'd never live to see it, Marbury 
v. Madison actually being cited in a brief; but here's 
the man himself, Chief Justice Marshall. (And who, 
listening to the CNN coverage of the war in Iraq, 
hasn't heard the phrase "Marshall law"?): 
"When an instrument...define[s] the jurisdiction of the 
supreme court by declaring the cases in which it shall take 
original jurisdiction, and that in others it shall take appellate 
jurisdiction; the plain import of the words seems to be, that 
in one class of cases its jurisdiction is original and not 
appellate: in the other it is appellate, and not original.... It is 
the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that it revises 
and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, 
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and does not create that cause." (Italics and underlining added.) 
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137,175, 5 U.S. 137, 2 L.Ed. 60. 
"To issue a writ of mandamus to an officer for the delivery 
of a paper is in effect the same as to sustain an original action 
for the paper, and belongs to "original jurisdiction and not to 
appellate jurisdiction." 
Marbury v. Madison, Dist.Col., 5 O.S. 137,1 Cranch 137, 
2 L.Ed. 60. 
"A mandamus to an officer is held to be the exercise of 
original jurisdiction; but a mandamus to an inferior court of 
the United States, is in the nature of appellate jurisdiction." 
Ex parte Crane, 1831, 5 Peters (30 U.S.) 190,193, 8 L.Ed. 92. 
"[Establ ished pursuant to executive instructions for the 
government of the armies , to try military offenses 'under the 
common law of war' [during the Civil Warl...the commission 
did not exercise such 'judicial' power that review would be an 
exercise of appellate, rather than original, jurisdiction. The 
opinion concludes with the observation that 'there is no 
original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court to issue a writ of 
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum to review or reverse its pro-
ceedings, or the writ of certiorari to revise the proceedings of 
a military commission'." (Underlining added.) 
Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure: 
Jurisdiction 2d. § 4005, p. 101 n. 15—citing Ex parte Vallandigham, 
1863, 1 Wall. (68 U.S.) 243, 253,17 L.Ed. 589. 
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In summation then, having wearied myself on this point to where 
further words and citations fail me, I recapitulate it briefly once again: 
The action I have commenced before this honorable Court is an original 
proceeding, original proceeding, original proceeding. It ain't no appeal, 
ain't no appeal, ain't no appeal, and I begrudge the honorable Court any 
attempt to reinvent, recast, or redefine it that way appertaining to some 
damned inapplicable statute. 
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Now here's a little I.Q. test to see if any of you Gang of Five 
operating down there on State Street have enough brains to give you 
back pressure to blow your noses with. Do you have any idea how your 
contrasting constitutional predication puts you in the catbird seat 
juxtaposed to your accessories the Gang of Nine? They don't have the 
organic power you have! 
Compare: 
All excerpts and case citations derived from Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice 
and Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d §§ 4005,4015, and 4016. (All underlining and italics 
added.) 
"Statutory authority to issue extraordinary writs [was 
combined into All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1651, in the 1948 
codification of the Judicial Code and] is limited by the 
constitutional constraints of Article III....More distinctive limits 
derive from the difference between the Supreme Court's original 
and appellate jurisdictions. § 4005, p. 99 
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"Cases frequently arose in the state courts that combined 
issues reviewable by appeal with other issues that were 
reviewable only by certiorari....but it became settled that the 
certiorari issues could be presented in the appeal papers without 
filing a separate petition. § 4016, p. 265 
The nonappealable issue is treated...as if contained in a petition 
for a writ of certiorari, see 28 U.S.C.A. § 2103....' 
Mishkin v. New York , 1966, 86 S.Ct. 958, 965, 383 U.S. 502, 
512, 16 L.Ed.2d 56. 
"[0]nce an appeal was properly taken, the appellant had a 
right to argue all federal questions in the case, including issues 
that standing alone could be raised only by petition for 
certiorari. § 4016, p. 265 
fln finding that we have appellate jurisdiction, we also take 
jurisdiction over any aspects of the cases which would otherwise fall 
within our certiorari jurisdiction/ (Underlining added.) 
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 1975, 95 S.Ct. 1029, 1042 
n. 14, 43 L.Ed.2d 328. 
"In an uncertain number of cases, the Supreme Court refused 
to decide state court appeals properly within its jurisdiction....So 
long as the statutory distinction between appeal and certiorari 
existed, these cases provided a critical test of the traditional 
understanding that appeal jurisdiction provided review as a 
matter of right, while certiorari jurisdiction provided review as a 
matter of discretion....Cases that did not involve the validity of a 
state or federal statute or treaty were relegated to discretionary 
review by certiorari, no matter how important the individual 
rights that might be involved. § 4015, pp. 250 & 261 
In Southern & Northern Overlying Carrier Chapters v. 
Public Utils. Commn., 1977, 98 S.Ct. 251, 434 U.S. 9, 54 L.Ed.2d 8, 
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Justice Rehnquist dissented, urging that the statutory distinction 
between certiorari and appeal jurisdiction required adjudication on 
the merits... §4015, p. 253 n. 12 
"There is no clear support in legislative history for the 
argument that in distinguishing between appeal and certiorari, 
Congress intended to exclude all discretionary doctrines from 
the disposition of appeal cases....There is little to be gained in 
abstract debate about the inherent nature of an appeal, or about 
the power of Congress to regulate the Court's jurisdiction by 
denying discretion if it chooses, § 4015, p. 261 
"The All Writs Act [28 U.S.C.A. § 1651] authorizes the 
Supreme Court and all Courts established by Act of Congress to 
[subpart (a)] issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid 
of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and 
principles of law. 
The limits of this open-ended authority have never been 
precisely defined. § 4005, p. 97 
It has been observed that the Supreme Court's writ jurisdiction is 
'dependent upon a statute which is vague in terms and by reference 
incorporates the common law,' and that this vagueness is supple-
mented by the fact that 'with regard to the extraordinary writs, avoid-
ance of technical, indeed even of non-technical, questions has always 
been a policy of the Court.' citing Wolfson, Extraordinary Writs in the 
Supreme Court Since Ex Parte Peru, 1951, 51 Co.L.Rev. 977, 989. 
§ 4005, p. 97 n. 2 
The power of this Court to issue writs of prohibition never has 
been clearly defined by statute or by decisions.' Ex parte Bakelite 
Corp., 1929, 49 S.Ct. 411, 412, 279 U.S. 438, 448, 73 L.Ed. 789. 
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"Clearly Congress has power to limit appellate writ jurisdic-
tion, just as any other branch of appellate jurisdiction. 
§ 4005, p. 103 
As Judge Friendly noted, '[W]e find it hard to believe, in the 
absence of better evidence than the Reviser's Note [All Writs Act, 28 
U.S.C.A. § 1651 / 1948 codification of Judicial Code], that Congress 
meant to curtail a power the Supreme Court had possessed for 159 
years.' US. v. Weinstein, C.A.2d, 1971, 452 F.2d 704, 711, 
certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 1766, 406 U.S. 917, 32 L.Ed. 873. 
§ 4005, p. 104 n. 25 
It was further concluded [in Ex parte Yerger*, 1868, 8 Wall. (75 
U.S.) 85 at 103, 19 L.Ed. 332] that the act of 18681, 'passed under 
such circumstances' as it was, should not be taken to remove the 
appellate power the Court had enjoyed from the beginning without 
2 
resort to the act of 1867 . (Notations added.) § 4005, p. 101 n. 13 
An Act to Amend an Act Entitled "An Act to Amend the Judici-
ary Act, Passed the Twenty-Fourth of September, Seventeen Hundred 
and Eighty-Nine," ch. 34, 15 Stat. 44 (1869). 
2 
An Act to Amend "An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the 
United States," Approved September Twenty-Fourth, Seventeen 
Hundred and Eighty-Nine, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385-387 (1868). 
*ln regard to Ex parte Yerger supra, text from that holding of 
the Court is highly conducive of the intellection at hand: 
"[W]e must determine the true meaning of the Constitution and the law in 
respect to the appellate jurisdiction of this court We are not at liberty to 
except from it any cases not plainly excepted by law; and we think it sufficiently 
appears from what has been said that no exception to this jurisdiction embraces 
such a case as that now before the court. On the contrary, the case is one of 
those expressly declared not to be excepted from the general grant of jurisdic-
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tion.... 
"It is proper to add, that we are not aware of anything in any act of 
Congress, except the act of 1868, which indicates any intention to withhold 
appellate jurisdiction in habeas corpus cases [and please take note, boys, 
how that contrasts with original jurisdiction in habeas corpus 
cases] from this court, or to abridge the jurisdiction derived from the 
Constitution and defined by the act of 1789. We agree that it is given subject 
to exception and regulation by Congress; but it is too plain for argument that 
the denial to this court of appellate jurisdiction in this class of cases must., 
seriously hinder the establishment of that uniformity in deciding upon questions 
of personal rights which can only be attained through appellate jurisdiction, 
exercised upon the decisions of courts of original jurisdiction. 
"These considerations forbid any construction giving to doubtful words the 
effect of withholding or abridging this jurisdiction. They would strongly 
persuade against the denial of the jurisdiction even were the reasons for 
affirming it less cogent that they are....We are obliged to hold, therefore, 
that...this court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, may, by the writ of 
habeas corpus, aided by the writ of certiorari, revise the decision of the Circuit 
Court....This conclusion brings us to the inquiry whether the 2d section of the 
act of March 27th, 1868, takes away or affects the appellate jurisdiction of this 
court under the Constitution and the acts of Congress prior to 1867. 
In McCardle's case [Ex Parte Mcdrdle, 74 U.S. 506 (Wall.) (1868) ] , 
...the argument having been concluded on the 9th of March, 186°> was taken 
under advisement by the court. While the cause was thus held, and before the 
court had time to consider the decision proper to be made, the repealing act 
under consideration was introduced into Congress. It was carried through both 
houses, sent to the President, returned with his objections, repassed by the 
constitutional majority in each house, and became a law on the 27th of March, 
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within eighteen days after the conclusion of the argument The effect of the act 
was to oust the court of its jurisdiction of the particular case then before it on 
appeal, and it is not to be doubted that such was the effect intended. Nor will 
it be questioned that legislation of this character is unusual and hardly to be 
lustifled except upon some imperious public exigency. It was, doubtless, within 
the constitutional discretion of Congress to determine whether such an exigency 
existed; but it is not to be presumed that an act, passed under such 
circumstances, was intended to have any further effect than that plainly 
apparent from its terms." 
God damn, I sure hope you're gett ing this, and that it 
giues you trepid pause. 
"The limitation of extraordinary writ review to appellate 
uses presents few practical problems today. § 4005 , p. 101 
A writ of mandamus issued...'in a case already instituted in the 
courts...is deemed a part of the appellate jurisdiction of this court, 
which is subject to such regulations as the Congress shall make.' 
In re Winn, 1909, 29 S.Ct. 515, 517, 213 U.S. 458, 465-466, 
53 L.Ed. 873 (per Moody, J.) § 4005, p. 103 n. 21 
"[A]nd if ever there should be a case actually demanding 
prompt Supreme Court action, it can be secured by initial 
application to a lower court and virtually simultaneous 
application to the Supreme Court. The intricate theoretical 
problems generally have no present practical importance." 
§ 4005, p. 102 
Oh yeah, there's words of reassurance. LUe don't 
haue to worry about partisan spirits on the Senate 
Judiciary Committee conspiring to use euen iust mere 
39 
rules of order to obstruct the filling of federal 
judgeships and whatnot. Arcane constitutional 
considerations surelg aren't much of a concern. 
Now listen up, here's the second most crucial 
citation in the whole brief: 
"Chief Justice Fuller provided the leading statement of 
congressional control in the extraordinary writ context in U.S. v. 
Dickinson, 1909, 29 S.Ct. 485, 487-488, 213 U.S. 92, 100-101, 53 L.Ed. 711.... 
[T]he Court went on to reject an alternative claim that the All 
Writs Act authorized review by certiorari. The opinion relied on 
the rule that congressional definition of the Court's appellate 
jurisdiction precludes any exercise of jurisdiction not defined by 
Congress, and found it 'quite inadmissible' to draw from the All 
Writs Act a jurisdiction precluded by construction of the more 
specific statutes." § 4005, p. 99 n. 23 
Do you understand what's going on there? One set of congressional 
enactments establishes the U.S. Supreme Court's appellate authority, and 
another set of congressional enactments establishes its extraordinary writ 
authority. NOW THEORETICALLY, because certiorari is an extraordinary 
writ just like the other extraordinary writs of habeas corpus, scire facias, 
injunction, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, etc., then if Congress 
clearly intended to deny the Supreme Court review of such and such 
cases under one statutory authority, maybe the Court could still get away 
with issuing a writ of certiorari under the other. Well, what Justice Fuller 
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is pointing out in the last citation above is that that would be like a father 
telling his son, "I'll give you money for food, if you'll promise me you 
won't spend it on beer." And the boy promises, spends the money on 
food, and then trades the food for beer. It might be argued that that was 
never technically disallowed by the father, or the extraordinary writ of 
certiorari in such postulated cases never technically disallowed the 
Supreme Court by Congress. But Justice Fuller is herewith promising 
that the Supreme Court would never resort to such a thin device in regard 
to certiorari and the legislative edict which equips them to issue the writ. 
Well, you Utah bunch who have adopted black as your gang colors 
are now proposing to cheerfully self-inhibit yourselves where the framers 
of the Utah Constitution did not. "Has the state legislature decreed by 
pronunciamento that our appellate authority doesn't extend to small 
claims matters? Well then, it wouldn't be gentlemanly to use our 
constitutionally unlimited extraordinary writ power to review such cases 
either, would it?" The United States Supreme Court may be forced to lie 
on that Procrustes' bed, but you want to throw yourselves down on it. In 
doing so you'll be reduced to five mere catamites (small boys used for 
immoral purposes) existing only to cater to and indulge the state 
legislature. 
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It is intriguing to note that the statute under scrutiny, U.C.A. § 78-6-
10(2), reads, "THE decision of the trial de novo may not be 
appealed unless the court rules on the constitutionality of a 
Statute or ordinance", rather than, " A decis ion. . . / ' (Underlining 
and emphatic capitalization added.) And the construction most 
obtaining would be that this refers to the FINAL JUDGMENT of the case: 
"The court's decision of a case is its judgment thereon. The 
Judicial Code uses 'decision' as the equivalent of 'judgment' and 
'decree.' Sections 1281, 2382" (Notations added.) 
U.S.— Rogers v. Hill, N.Y., 53 S.Ct. 731 at 734, 289 U.S. 582, 587, 
77 L.Ed. 1385, 88 A.L.R. 744 (1933). 
1
 Judicial Code (of 1911) §128 = 28 USC §225 (1946) 
= 28 USC §§1291-1295 (current) 
2
 Judicial Code (of 1911) §238 = 28 USC §345 (1946) 
= section appears not to have survived the 
judicial code revision in 1948 
"The words 'judgment' and 'decision' are interchangeable, and 
use of word 'decision' in place of word 'judgment' was a defect in 
form only...." 
Erardi v. Krystofalski, 184 A.2d 676,23 Conn.Sup. 476, 
1 Conn.Cir. 324. 
"[T]he terms 'judgment'...'decision'...are more or less cognate as 
applied in legal proceedings, and closely allied in meaning...A 
'judgment' is a final determination of a cause given by any competent 
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tribunal...A 'decision' has been defined to be a judgment given by a 
competent tribunal." (Underlining added.) 
Halbert v. Alford, Tex., 16 S.W. 814, 815. 
"It is true that in an abstract sense there is a shade of difference 
between the import of the word 'decision' and the word 'judgment'. 
"The decision is the resolution of the principles which determine the 
controversy: the judgment is the formal paper applying them to the 
rights of the parties" 
Buckeye Pipe-Line Co. v. Fee, 57 N.E. 446, 447, 62 Ohio St. 543, 
78 Am.St.Rep. 743, citing Abb.Law Diet. 351; 
Freem.Judgm. § 22; Whart.Law Diet. 235, 437. 
"[T]he word 'decision' has the same meaning as the word 
'judgment.' A decision of the court is its judgment." 
Board of Education of City of Emporia v. State, 52 P. 466, 467, 
7 Kan.App. 620. 
"The word 'decision' as used in Sess. Laws 1901, c. 81 , S 40...means 
the same as 'judgment.'" 
Gentz's Estate v. Galles, 93 P. 702, 703, 14 N.M. 341, citing 
13 Cyc. p. 427; 1 Bouvier (Rawle's Revision) 517. 
"The term 'decision' found in section 11578, General Code, is 
used in that section in the sense of judgment." 
Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Musselli, 130 N.E. 32, 33, 
102 Ohio St. 10. 
"As used in Code...decision of court...means 'judgment' or 'final 
order.'" 
State v. Hamilton, 156 N.E.2d 326, 327,107 Ohio App. 37. 
"'[D]ecision' meaning a judgment given by a competent tribunal." 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Richards, 204 N.Y.S. 246, 248,123 
Misc. 83. 
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"A 'decision' is a judgment of a court. Rap. & L. Law Diet." 
In re Milford & M. R. R., 36 A. 545, 548, 68 N.H. 570. 
" A 'decision' is announcement by court of its judgment." 
Hilton v. Hymers, 65 P.2d. 679, 685 57 Nev. 391. 
"The 'decision' of a court is its judgment." 
Adams v. Yazoo &M. V. R. Co., 24 So. 317, 318, 77 Miss. 
194, 60 L.R.A. 33. 
In the course of producing this brief (my first and only such assay-
men t), I perused scores, perhaps even hundreds, of petitions for 
extraordinary writ. And I cannot recall even a single one which was 
directed toward the final judgment of a case (i.e., entreating the 
reviewing court to set it aside for insufficiency of the evidence or such.) 
Invariably, such petitions were used in an interlocutory fashion and were 
directed toward some interim issue in the case. (Seeking extraordinary 
relief because the indictment or information hadn't been properly filed, 
or the summons hadn't been properly served, or something like that.) 
And although I know there is a rubric which generally mandates (along 
with the need to present a dispositive issue) that there is no interlocutory 
review if a case is not appealable on final judgment, I very much wonder 
if any conflict with § 78-6-10(2) isn't lessened (or even eliminated) by 
extraordinary relief so confined. 
In this respect I bid the Court's attention to an article, published in 
Vol. XVI of the Utah Bar Bulletin, Nos. 8, 9,10 (August-October, 1946), p. 
113, and reproduced in its entirety as Appendix "B" in the Addendum, 
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entitled "The Use of the Writ of Prohibition in the State of Utah as a Means of 
Intermediary Review". Authored by former Utah Supreme Court Justice 
James H. Wolfe (do you recollect the Very Most Reverend Justice Wolfe 
herebefore cited?), he therein treated most of the Utah cases touching on 
prohibition up to that time. 
I think what he wrote is most apropos to the present cogitations of the 
honorable Court: 
" I n 1896 , the year the Constitution of Utah became 
operative, our Supreme Court held that article 8, section 9 of 
the Constitution, which provides that an appeal shall lie 
'from all final judgments of the district courts,' was a 
limitation on the power of the Supreme Court to entertain 
appeals. Under this holding the court had no power under 
the Constitution to entertain any appeals other than final 
judgments . * * * 
"This holding that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction 
to entertain appeals except from final judgments obtained 
until 1937 , when it was expressly overruled in Attorney 
General v. Pomeroy, 9 3 Utah 4 2 6 , 73 P. (2 .d) 1277. I t is out 
of this background that the wri t of prohibition has evolved 
into a limited wri t of supervisory control and within certain 
limits a remedy for intermediate rev iew/ ' (p . 113 ) (Underlin-
ing added.) 
DON'T YOU GET IT? The Utah Supreme Court at that time felt that 
the state Constitution permitted them appellate jurisdiction only over final 
judgments. But that same Constitution granted them unlimited, untram-
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meled original jurisdiction over extraordinary writs. So they said to 
themselves, "Hmm, if ever we need to exert interim review of some issue 
in a case before it reaches final judgment, we'll just use extraordinary 
writ process to do it." 
Let's again harken to the Very Most Reverend Justice Wolfe's article 
in the Utah Bar Bulletin at p. 119, where he goes on to say: 
" [ I ] t was expressly recognized in the opinion in Atwood 
v. Cox [88 Utah 437,55 P.2d 377] that the wr i t of prohibition 
could under certain named circumstances be used as a 
proceeding for an intermediate review. . . . " (Underlining added.) 
Then later in Justice Wolfe's article at p. 120: 
" I t also appears that the wri t of prohibition can be used 
as an intermediate wri t of review where facts warrant it. 
The rule is thus stated in Mayers V. Bronson, 100 Utah 279 , 
114 P.2d 213: . . . . " (Underlining added.) 
Then later at p. 124: 
" I t thus appears that by the cases of Atwood v. Cox, 
supra, and subsequent cases based upon it, together wi th 
the case of Attorney General v. Pomeroy, supra, the 
Supreme Court is in position to entertain an intermediary 
review either through the instrumentality of the wr i t of 
prohibition or by direct appeal from an interlocutory ruling 
where the exigencies of the situation demand it. But the 
court will not in any case either grant the wri t nor entertain 
an appeal from an interlocutory order where the situation is 
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such as will abide the event of final judgment. In those 
cases where there is both lack or excess of jurisdiction and 
the element of irretrievability the court grants the writ or 
entertains an appeal. In other cases the entertainment of 
the appeal before final judgment or the issuance of the writ 
will be in the discretion of the court, which discretion will 
depend on factors dealing with irretrievability, hazard and 
public interest and importance." (Underlining added.) 
Finally, consider two citations from one of the cases supra (Mayers v. 
Bronson at 216 and 217 respectively), and then I'll try to hammer home 
the point I've been assaying to make. 
(I realize it ain't strictly according to Hoyle to quote the headnotes of a 
case report, but...): 
"The very purpose of a liberalized right to bring 
prohibition is to prevent intermediate appeals where such 
appeals would otherwise be the only means of preventing 
injustice, and the right to bring such an appeal is not an 
'adequate remedy' which bars prohibition." (Underlining 
added.) 
(Ah, what the Frogs call the cut de grass...): 
"The language in Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 
117, at page 122, 26 S.Ct. 356, at page 358, 50 L.Ed.686, 
where the court refused to entertain an appeal from an 
interlocutory order requiring a party to do an act, even 
though questionably within the jurisdiction of the lower 
court, must be construed as confined to appeals and not 
writs of prohibition." 
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All right, are ya gettin' it? The language of U.C.A. § 78-6-10(2), must 
be strictly construed, and when it says , "THE decision of the trial de novo 
may not be appealed", it means the final decision of the case and not some 
interim decision. And if some little Wisenheimer thinks to object, "Yeah, 
but the standard precept is that if a final decision is not appealable, neither 
is any interim decision", that principle is not applicable to prohibition, 
as the foregoing citations were meant to show. 
AND THE PROOF OF THAT IS, has the Utah Supreme Court ever 
issued a writ of prohibition to a justice court in a criminal case, despite the 
fact that a determination of the justice court wasn't appealable to the 
Supreme Court? (Nor could there be any review by the Supreme Court, 
for that matter, of the district court's subsequent de novo decision of such a 
case brought to it.) YES, such an instance is to be found in People v. 
Spiers, 4 Utah 385,10 P. 609,11 P. 509. To quote Justice Wolfe again at 
p. 123 in his Utah Bar Bulletin article : 
"The petitioner there was being tried by a j us t i ce ' s court 
for a crime over which it had no jurisdiction. The defendant 
applied for a wr i t of prohibition which issued/ ' 
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If I were on the bench, this next proffering would be called a 
"dictum". (Which if respelled and looked at in terms of its benefit to 
those encountering it, is probably an apt characterization.) 
The honorable Court has sought the assessment of the parties litigant, 
in light of U.C.A. § 78-6-10(2), and assuming that extraordinary relief in a 
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small claims action is nonetheless available in spite of it, "whether , 
and w h a t , l imits should be placed on the scope of 
the relier1 . In addressing this consideration of limits, I am somewhat 
placed in the position of a father expostulating with his adolescent 
daughter, "Don't sleep around, but if you're going to...." Bear in mind 
that what I hereafter adduce is prefaced by the caveat, "You really 
shouldn't, and if you must..." And like the Apostle Paul, I voice this only 
by way of concession unto you, and not with approval. ("But I speak this 
by permission, and not of commandment. For I would that all men were 
even as I myself." l§i Corinthians chap. 7, w. 6 & 7, King James Version.) 
Anyway, I say again that I don't like to make any sort of "If you have 
get drunk, at least get drunk at home" allowance to you, but if you otherwise 
feel compelled to die by your own hand as regards self-imposed 
nonintervention for the most part, in small claims cases by extraordinary 
writ, at least reserve unto yourselves intermediary review power merely 
in regard to the threshold (in limine) issues. Three come to mind 
immediately: 
1.) Questions of jurisdiction 
2.) Questions of proper venue (C.J.A. Rule 4-803, pertaining to 
trial de novo in small claims cases, provides under subpart 
(B), "Either party may move for a change of venue under the applicable 
Rules of Civil Procedure." 
3.) Questions of disqualification of a judge 
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Having thus ruled, court is dismissed sine die and Justice Panos 
leaves the bench. 
Conclusion and Precise Relief Sought 
For the foregoing reasons, it is clear and unambiguous that (a.) the 
fee to the justice court is jurisdictional for perfecting any appeal c/e novo 
to the district court, (b.) the Defendant/Real Party in Interest did not pay 
the fee within the time allowed for appeal, and (c.) the district court does 
not have jurisdiction to entertain the appeal per the plain language of the 
applicable rules. Nor can the district court exercise any "equitable 
discretion" prior to obtaining jurisdiction of the case, nor do any 
circumstances of the case warrant it to do so. Therefore the Court is 
prayed to issue its writ of prohibition to the district court, directing that it 
cannot assume jurisdiction, and further directing it to enter an order of 
dismissal of the cause of the Defendant/Real Party in Interest on appeal. 
Further, the Court is obtested to hold that it is endowed with an 
inviolate constitutional power to intervene by extraordinary writ 
in any juridical issue to which it may choose to direct itself within 
this state; that it is an absolute right of every citizen to invoke this 
jurisdiction by petitioning the Court for its prerogative discretion; 
and that this authority of the Court cannot be constricted by any 
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statute, by order or decision of any other tribunal, or even by 
self-imposed rule of the Court itself. 
Respectfully submitted (and if not apparently so, it is genuinely so), 
Clifton W. Panos pro se 
DATED this " I ' " " day of November, 2003. Petitioner/Plaintiff 
.^v cn r w
l i s » 
Certificate of Service 
Service is constated upon the respective parties' counsels—to each 
of them two (2) true and correct replications of the foregoing document 
entitled BRIEF OF PETITIONER ON REHEARING—along with two (2) 
copies each of the separately bound Addendum thereto—via posting by 
the U.S. Mail, with first-class postage and all other fees prepaid, to their 
respective addresses as shown on the official U.S. Postal Service 
Certificates of Mailing exhibited at Appendix "E" of the Addendum, per 
the dates postmarked thereon. 
Clifton W. Panos pro se 
Petitioner/Plaintiff 
Epilogue 
v. 10 Then said Paul, I stand at Caesar's judgment seat, where I ought to be 
judged: to the Jews have I done no wrong, as thou very well knowest. 
v. 11 For if I be an offender, or have committed any thing worthy of death, I 
refuse not to die: but if there be none of these things whereof these accuse me, 
no man may deliver me unto them. I appeal unto Caesar. 
v. 12 Then Festus, when he had conferred with the council, answered, Hast 
thou appealed unto Caesar? unto Caesar shalt thou go. 
TheActs of the Apostles, chap. 25 (King James Version) 
Had I been acting as counsel to the apostle, I would have advised him to invoke 
Caesar's original jurisdiction rather than his appellate jurisdiction and petition for 
habeas corpus instead. (I mean heck, they all spoke Latin back then, didn't they?) 
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13. Action <&=>63 
If litigants ask for extraordinary writs 
of prohibition and permit other rights to 
expire, they do so at their peril. 
PRATT, J., dissenting. 
Original proceeding by James Robinson 
against the City Court for the City of 
Ogden, Weber County, State of Utah, and 
J. Quill Nebeker, Judge thereof, to pro-
hibit the judge from enforcing a certain 
judgment holding the petitioner in con-
tempt of court and sentencing him to a 
fine or term in jail. 
Alternative writ made permanent. 
Edward W. Clyde, of Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff. 
Ira A. Huggins, of Ogden, for defend-
ants. 
LATIMER, Justice. 
Petitioner instituted original proceed-
ings in this court to prohibit defendant 
Judge of the City Court of Ogden City, 
Utah, from enforcing a certain judgment 
holding petitioner in contempt of court and 
sentencing him to a fine or term in jail. 
The facts out of which this controversy 
arose are these: Petitioner had appeared 
in the City Court of Ogden City to answer 
a criminal charge of disturbing the peace. 
Defendant judge heard the matter, peti-
tioner was found guilty, and ordered to pay 
a fine or in the alternative to serve a jail 
sentence. Petitioner then left the court-
house and about one-half hour later re-
turned to the office of the city attorney to 
pay the fine. He was directed to go to the 
office of the desk sergeant, which was lo-
cated on the ground floor of the same 
building. The defendant judge had recess-
ed court and was preparing to leave the 
building. The judge and petitioner arrived 
at the elevator shaft on the fifth floor of 
the building about the same time, both 
waiting for the elevator and as they 
stepped on, the petitioner made the fol-
lowing statement: 'Tha t is the worst ex-
ample of a Kangaroo Court I have ever 
seen." The judge overheard it, took the 
petitioner by the arm, escorted him to the 
the assistant city attorney and the clerk 
of the court to accompany both himself and 
the petitioner to the courtroom. The judge 
then took off his hat and coat, convened 
the court, found the petitioner guilty of 
contempt for having made the remark, and 
imposed sentence. 
[1] A reference to the applicable stat-
utes and cases in respect to contempts and 
procedure for punishing, if committed, will 
suffice to dispose of this proceeding. Sec-
tion 104—45—1, U.C.A., 1943, enumerates 
acts and omissions constituting contempt. 
The substance of the sections applicable 
here are: (1) That disorderly, contemptu-
ous or insolent behavior toward the judge 
while holding the court tending to interrupt 
the due course of trial or other judicial 
proceeding are contempts of the authority 
of the court, and (2) Any other unlawful 
interference with the process or proceed-
ings of the court are likewise contemptu-
ous acts. 
The facts of this proceeding do not bring 
the petitioner under the first quoted sub-
section. Admitting, if necessary, that peti-
tioner's behavior was contemptuous or in-
solent, it was expressed while the judge 
and petitioner were either in the elevator 
or just about to enter it. The judge was 
not holding court, he had already adjourn-
ed the morning session, he was on his way 
out of the building, and no trial or other 
judicial proceedings were then in progress. 
[2] There is grave doubt that petition-
er's conduct was such as to constitute a 
violation of the second provision of the 
statute quoted herein. The rule announc-
ed by the Supreme Court of the United 
States and by this court is that criticism 
after final disposition of an action is the 
exercise of the right of free speech and 
therefore not contemptuous. See Bridges 
v. State of California, 314 U.S. 252, 62 
S.Ct. 190, 86 L.Ed. 192, 159 A.L.R. 1346; 
Kirkham v. Sweetring, 108 Utah 397, 160 
P.2d 435. In view of our decision on the 
other aspect of this case, it is not necessary 
to comment on the contention that the be-
havior of the petitioner went beyond the 
limits of criticism. 
Section 104—45—3, U.C.A., 1943, pro-
